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1 Introduction
Since the implementation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), its
relatively smooth functioning has attracted increasing interests in similar
endeavours in other parts of the world (De Grauwe and Melitz, 2005,
and Chey, 2009), especially where monetary uni¯cation projects have
been reassessed and sometimes relaunched historically. The Middle East
region is among these areas, notably within the members of the Gulf
Cooperation Council: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Although the prospect of a monetary
union among these countries has recently stagnated (with some countries
even disengaging from the convergence plans), o±cial statements by its
prospective members still suggest that the deadline of 2010 should not be
pushed too far away. Following the work of Zaidi (1990), the project has
also attracted academic attention, and the approaching o±cial deadline
has triggered renewed interests with broadly optimistic assessments (see
the recent evaluations by Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn, 2008, Buiter, 2008a,
Furceri and Karras, 2008, and Pattanaik, 2007, for instance).
However, most of the studies look at this project from the viewpoint
of the traditional literature on Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) and
focuses on ex-ante criteria for belonging to a successful monetary union.
Although ex-post criteria have attracted increasing attention recently,
internal shocks (and the ensuing divergence processes) still lie at the core
of their reasoning. Since the seminal contributions of Mundell (1961),
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969), the literature weighs the bene¯ts
of having a common currency against the costs of losing monetary au-
tonomy. As long as the bene¯ts of possessing a single currency arise
solely from a reduction in transaction costs for internal transactions, the
bene¯ts are certainly greater when member countries trade more inten-
sively within a union. On the other hand, the costs are mainly due to
asymmetric shocks, i.e., shocks which induce divergence in the economic
growth of the member countries. Therefore, the optimality of mone-
tary unions fundamentally depends on the asymmetry of shocks, which
in turn is related to the degree of synchronization of shocks among the
prospective members of a monetary union. As Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2010) state, the asymmetry of shocks has become a catch-all concept to
capture the impacts of all types of shocks (supply and demand) as well
as the structure of the economy, which \in turn may a®ect the nature
and speed of adjustment of the economy to shocks (p. 26)." Hence, the
OCA criteria generally look at factors inside a newly formed monetary
union in investigating what could or would happen after the introduction
of a new currency. It is true that the more recent literature, notably fol-
lowing the line of Frankel and Rose's (1997, 1998) argument, has stated
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that countries which would not form an optimum currency area ex ante
could evolve towards such a reference point by reducing the asymmetry
of real output movements. Such an ex post evolution would originate
from the reorganization and rationalization of production activities in-
side the union.
However, such a perspective overlooks an important aspect of mone-
tary unions. As Bordo and James (2008) argue by looking at the histor-
ical evidence, multinational monetary unions can be fragile, or strongly
weakened by external common shocks (in particular, they study the im-
pact of World War I, and the ensuing business cycle divergence it has
induced). Assessing the viability of a multinational monetary union
against common external shocks may prove crucial, as proved by the
demise of some well-known monetary unions, such as the Latin Monetary
Union, the Scandinavian one, and, more recently, the one of Czechoslo-
vakia. As we discuss below, this feature is particularly important in
the case of the GCC countries. While it is true that some authors,
e.g., Nitsch (2005) and Rose (2007), emphasize in°ationary shocks as
the most important determinant for the dissolution of monetary unions,
their arguments do not contradict the possibilities that the gap in in°a-
tion rates between monetary union members may be induced by external
shocks and the following member economies' reactions to such shocks.
In other words, the traditional argument of the OCA theory is that a
prospective monetary union will not be sustainable under the following
two conditions: Either its members face asymmetric (or asynchronous)
shocks and/or they respond asymmetrically to uniform shocks (a dif-
ference in reactions which itself may be due to their di®erent economic
structures since varying degrees of price and wage °exibility, for example,
induce asynchronous shocks). However, the empirical studies that look
at the optimality of a monetary union have not explicitly distinguished
whether such shocks originate from within the monetary union or from
its outside. Prominent examples include Alesina et al. (2002) and Barro
and Tenreyro (2007) which study the impact of currency unions on the
pattern of covariance of shocks, but do not distinguish shocks according
to their origins (external or internal) and simply consider the impact of
all the shocks (whatever their natures are) on a union's member macroe-
conomic indicators. For the GCC countries, such an argument is espe-
cially valid, as it has been shown that symmetric shocks in the region,
be they real or nominal, are associated with signi¯cantly di®erent vari-
ances (Razzak, 2009). This result is re¯ned in the study by Rosmy et al.
(2010), which distinguishes between demand and supply shocks, di®er-
entiates their oil and non-oil parts, and shows that the sole symmetric
shocks for these countries are actually the oil-demand shocks. However,
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the origins of the shocks considered are not mentioned there. In sum, the
literature deals with the consequences of the shocks, but di®erentiating
the impact of the origins of the shocks is still an open question and has
not received much considerations in the literature.
Besides the existing criteria for a currency area, therefore, we con-
sider in this paper how a multinational monetary union can resist to
the shocks coming from the rest of the world. In other words, we are
interested in the conditions under which a monetary union can survive
external shocks. In order to analyze the consequences of external shocks
on a multinational monetary union, we ¯rst build a simple model of a
monetary union, focusing on the divergent characteristics of members
when they have di®erent degrees of sensitivities to external shocks.
We then demonstrate the relevance of our argument by looking at
one of the most striking examples of monetary union projects that could
be threatened by external shocks, i.e., the one currently contemplated by
the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council. While being a prominent
example of on-going Arab economic integration (Hoekman and Sekkat,
2010), its feasibility has not been examined from the speci¯c perspective
we adopt here. Unfortunately, our assessment of the sustainability of this
monetary union project is not quite optimistic unless strong deepening
of political integration happens prior to (or, at least, in parallel with)
monetary uni¯cation, and the new central bank receives large amount of
o±cial reserves from its founding members. This emphasis on political
commitment is detailed in a book by Rutledge (2009), which stresses the
lack of institutional preparation for the planned monetary union as an
impediment for its establishment.1
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model upon
which our argument rests. The following section establishes the features
of the monetary union when the sensitivities of its members to external
shocks di®ers. Section 4 applies the model's insights to the GCC case
and provides some comparisons with the European experience. Section
5 concludes the paper.
2 The model
Our model basically consists of a description of the economic structure
of a monetary union and a speci¯cation of policy-making bodies' pref-
erences. In this section, we ¯rst describe the situation under autonomy
and compute each policy-maker's optimal interest rate as a function of
each country's characteristics.
1Chey (2009) has a similar focus on political-economy issues in discussing possible
monetary unions in East Asia.
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2.1 Economy
The framework we use is based on the literature on discretion and time-
consistency (see for example Walsh, 2010, chapter 7, and Alesina and
Barro, 2002). For the simplicity of exposition, we assume that the union
consists of 2 economies, indexed by j = 1; 2: The aggregate demand of
an economy j is described by the following equation:
ydj;t = ¡® (it ¡ ¼j;t) ; (1)
where ydj;t; it; and ¼j;t are respectively the aggregate demand, the nominal
interest rate and the in°ation rate of this economy at time t, whereas ®
is a positive parameter:
On the other hand, each economy's aggregate supply is given by a
Lucas-type supply function where unexpected in°ation boosts its output:
ysj;t = ¯ (¼j;t ¡ ¼et ) + !jÀt; (2)
where ysj;t and ¼
e
t are the aggregate supply and the expected in°ation
rate, while Àt represents period t's supply shock, originating from the
rest of the world, and !j is a positive parameter and signi¯es country j's
sensitivity to this shock.2 Also, ¯ is a parameter with a positive value.
In equilibrium, we have
¼j;t =
1
¯ ¡ ® (¡®it + ¯¼
e
t ¡ !jÀt) ; (3a)
yj;t =
¯
¯ ¡ ®
µ
¡®it + ®¼et ¡
®
¯
!jÀt
¶
: (3b)
Here, we suppose ® < ¯ so as to rule out an unrealistic behavior of
in°ation. The two local economies di®er from each other only with
respect to their individual sensitivities to the rest-of-the-world shock.
We suppose that the shock is normally distributed with a well-de¯ned
variance and a zero mean.
2.2 Policy-makers
In our model of a monetary union, monetary policy is decided by a fed-
eral college, consisting of country representatives. We also refer to them
2We do not consider national (or regional, or sectorial) shocks as well as any
demand shocks. Incorporating them would make the algebra more tedious, without
additional implications of great signi¯cance. Moreover, focusing on the external
supply shock reinforces the link between our setup and historical evidences on some
monetary unions demises, principally triggered by a price variation in an oversea
commodity market among others.
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as \governors." In order to focus on the impact of shocks, we discard dif-
ferences over their preferences and suppose that representatives agree on
the objectives to be followed. Namely, they all target the same in°ation
rate and the same output level.
Accordingly, the objective of each representative central banker, i.e.,
governor, is to minimize the following loss function:
Gj;t =
1
2
(¼j;t ¡ ¼¤)2 + ¸
2
(yj;t ¡ y¤)2 ; (4)
where we assume that the desired in°ation rate and output level (¼¤ and
y¤) are identical across all the governors.3 Moreover, we suppose exactly
the same preference for the monetary delegates (identical ¸), for the sake
of simplicity. The assumption of a common in°ation objective across the
union does not seem too unrealistic for countries sharing (or considering
to share) the same currency. Furthermore, we normalize these desired
values as ¼¤ = y¤ = 0.4
To complete the model, the timing of policy-making decisions needs
to be speci¯ed. Here, we consider that private agents form their expec-
tations ¯rst, and the value of the shock is subsequently revealed. Then,
the monetary authority sets its policy rate. Finally, transactions take
place, which determines the actual levels of output and in°ation.5
2.3 Optimal policy under autonomy
We start by deriving our benchmark case, i.e., what happens if a country
lives outside the monetary union? Even such an autonomous case is not
equivalent to autarky and the country is not immune from rest-of-the-
world shocks. Moreover, it may su®er from even larger shocks than
when it is a member of the monetary union since the relative size of
the outside world increases when staying out. In order to simplify the
discussion here and not to bias the results in any speci¯c way, we assume
that the sensitivity to external shocks under autonomy is the same as
when being inside the monetary union.
To determine each policy-maker's optimal interest rate, it su±ces
to notice that the model is fully symmetric around zero. Therefore, the
3Alternatively, y¤ can be considered as the di®erence between the desired and the
natural output growth rates. Here, this would simply mean that, while economies
may have di®erent natural output growth rates, the policy-makers try to minimize
the gap between the actual and the optimal growth rates.
4Note that, as we are interested solely in computing the parameter conditions for a
monetary union to be sustainable, this simpli¯cation about structurally deterministic
components is inocuous while it simpli¯es the algebra signi¯cantly.
5The model here is a static one and we do not consider reputation gains which
could accrue from the monetary uni¯cation.
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expected in°ation rate can only be equal to zero. For each local economy,
the preferred policy is therefore obtained by minimizing her loss function
over ij;t, while assuming that the expected in°ation rate is equal to zero.
This is the interest rate that that governor would choose to implement if
monetary policy was independently decided. Inserting this interest rate
in equations (3a) and (3b), one obtains
¼Aj;t = ¡
¸¯
1 + ¸¯2
!jÀt; (5a)
yAj;t =
1
1 + ¸¯2
!jÀt; (5b)
where the subscript A signi¯es \autonomy."
It is obvious from (5a) and (5b) that an external shock a®ects dif-
ferent countries di®erently, depending on the degrees of sensitivity, !j.
Hence, even though we assume that the countries have identical pref-
erences and objectives, monetary policy would need to be tailored to
their individual needs, due to the di®erentiated impacts of external
shocks, which are perceived asymmetrically between the respective mem-
ber states. An example of the situation we have in mind is the e®ects
of an oil shock, which would be symmetric at origin but felt di®erently
across nations, depending on a country's import dependence, industrial
structures, climate patterns, and so on.6
Even though a signi¯cant bene¯t of joining a monetary union stems
from the commitment of the newly founded central bank to ¯ght in°a-
tion, such a bene¯t depends on the new central bank's ability to adhere
to adopting the currency of the third country as an anchor or to a mon-
etary rule that guarantees the reduction of the in°ationary bias. In (5a)
and (5b), the existence of an idiosyncratic part of the common exter-
nal shocks implies that each member economy of a union could su®er
from joining a common monetary policy. Such an ambivalence is now
commonly recognized in the debates on the sustainability conditions for
monetary unions (see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2010, for example). We
adress this issue in the next section.
3 Life in a monetary union
3.1 Policy of the union's central bank
In a monetary union, the decisions over the interest rate are made by
a monetary policy body that is interested in the union's welfare as a
6Note that our theoretical result conforms with the ¯ndings in Nitsch (2005).
Although he considers in°ation di®erentials as the main culprit for the dissolution
of monetary unions (and dismisses the role of openness), he does not investigate the
impact of external shocks on in°ation dynamics.
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whole, rather than the situation of any single country in particular.
Such a body's preference is described by the following loss function:
Gft =
1
2
³
¼ft ¡ ¼¤
´2
+
¸
2
³
yft ¡ y¤
´2
; (6)
where ¼ft and y
f
t are respectively the weighted averages of the mem-
ber countries' in°ation rates and output levels,7 and the superscript f
indicates the case where the interest rate is chosen by a (federal) policy-
maker with a union-wide objective. In the two-country situation, we can
write these as
¼ft = ½¼1;t + (1¡ ½)¼2;t; (7a)
yft = ½y1;t + (1¡ ½) y2;t; (7b)
where ½ (½ 2 [0; 1]) is the relative weight assigned to country 1.
Invoking the assumptions of ¼¤ = y¤ = 0, the minimization of this
loss function under the constraints of the expressions in (7a) and (7b),
which give the union's in°ation rate and output level, leads to the fol-
lowing optimal interest rate:
ift = ¡
1 + ¸®¯
® (1 + ¸¯2)
(½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2) Àt: (8)
Hence, the union's monetary policy reacts to the external shocks by con-
sidering its members' idiosyncrasies and weighting them accordingly. By
plugging this interest rate into the expression of each country's in°ation
rate and output level, we obtain:
¼ft = ¡ (½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2)
®¸¯
(1 + ¸¯2)
Àt; (9a)
yft = (½!1 + (1¡ ½)!2)
®
1 + ¸¯2
Àt: (9b)
These equations indicate that, even in a highly stylized model, external
shocks cannot be disregarded since they impact the determination of
the optimal single monetary policy. Moreover, depending on the rela-
tive size of the countries, ½; and the sensitivity to external shocks, !,
the optimal union-wide monetary policy di®ers from the optimal policy
under autonomy. Quite intuitively, the gap between these two opti-
mal policies (autonomous and centralized) is all the more signi¯cant if
7This assumption is relatively standard in the literature as a union's objective.
For di®erent formulations, see Aaron-Cureau and Kempf (2006) for example.
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countries are of di®erent sizes and if external shocks are probable. The
likelihood of external shocks could be expected to be even higher if the
monetary union newly-founded central bank adopts the currency of the
third country as an external anchor. We now turn to the impact of such
an anchoring policy on our results.
3.2 The e®ects of exchange rate anchoring
Suppose that the new central bank adopts the currency of an external
anchor, the role of the exchange rate of the union vis-µa-vis the anchor
currency has to be incorporated in the model. As in von Hagen (1992),
or Kohler (2002), the inclusion of the exchange rate between the external
anchor and the new currency area leads to a modi¯cation in the model's
basic equations. Speci¯cally, the equation that represents the dynamics
of the exchange rate needs to be added to the aggregate demand and
supply equations.
The exchange rate equation for the union with a third-country cur-
rency can be described by the following equation:
eft = Ã
³
¼ft ¡ ¼at
´
: (10)
where e is the real exchange rate, a subscript a indicates the anchor
country, and Ã is a positive parameter:
Reordering this equation gives an expression for the evolution of the
union's in°ation rate, ¼ft , as a function of the exchange rate and of the
anchor currency's in°ation rate (and, de facto, monetary policy). Here,
we need to consider two di®erent cases. Firstly, if the new central bank
decides to ¯x the exchange rate or to adopt an anchoring policy, it will
experience pressures each time the anchor country's monetary policy is
modi¯ed. In such a case, the thrust of our argument would only be
strengthened since the union's monetary policy becomes more closely
linked to external considerations (and not only to external shocks hit-
ting each member economy). In other words, the pass-through from the
rest-of-the-world to the union will be reinforced. Secondly, it could be
the case where the central bank chooses to have a °oating, or °exible,
exchange rate. Indeed, this is the situation we have implicitly supposed
in the previous subsection where the union's monetary policy is deter-
mined solely by considering the members' economies. In this case, the
exchange rate movements hit each economy as an external shock, whose
magnitude is given by each economy's sensitivity to exchange rate °uc-
tuations. Therefore, explicitly incorporating the exchange rate relations
between the monetary union and the rest of the world into the model
does not lead to a qualitatively di®erent result than the one obtained
9
above.8
Whereas the model above is highly stylized and can only be consid-
ered as an illustrative one, we believe that, in the light of the analytical
observations it produces, the sustainability of monetary unions should
also be considered from the perspective of the occurrence of external
shocks (Farvaque and Matsueda, 2009). The next section discusses the
prospective project in the Gulf region from this particular viewpoint.
4 The Gulf Cooperation Council monetary union
4.1 Prospect and assessment
The member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), i.e.,
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), may seem very similar at ¯rst sight. They all depend
heavily on oil both in their outputs and in their exports. Moreover,
they share a number of geographical borders, a common language, and
high average living standards, which are attributable to the remarkable
economic growth rates since the 1970s, being on average above 2% p.a.
(an exception is Kuwait, where its growth rate has been barely positive
on average with a high volatility mainly due to its war years). While
not all of them are under the threat of depleting their oil reserves, they
are all facing rapid population growth which is now creating a need for
even higher economic growth rates.9 Diversi¯cation of their production
is also pressing, given the fact that the public sector still provides a large
part of employment to the indigenous part of the labor force.
Such similarities have probably contributed to stronger political re-
lations and created the impetus to policy coordination. E®orts have
been made along several dimensions, with trade being perceived as an
engine of growth, even though the negotiations related to a free trade
agreement between the GCC countries and the European Union have
ups-and-downs,10 revealing both the will and the impediments towards
a regional free trade area.
The integration process among the GCC countries o±cially started
in 1981, with the rati¯cation of the Charter of the GCC. From the start,
8Although this is out of the scope of the current paper, a more complete modeling
would induce quantitative changes as is shown in Ball (1999), for example.
9Since a substantial part of the population growth is related to imported foreign
labor, it can be controlled relatively easily through hardened immigration procedures
and visa requirements. Razzak (2009) also underlines this point.
10This trade agreement is currently suspended for a long while and presented as
to be concluded as soon as possible. See the 20th EU-GCC Joint Council and Min-
isterial Meeting (June 2010) communiqu¶e, which is available at the following URL:
http://eeas.europa.eu/gulf cooperation/index en.htm.
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monetary uni¯cation was considered as an ultimate goal of the process.
In 2001, the common currency, the Khaleeji, was agreed to be established
no later than 2010.11 In between, a customs union was to operate from
2003, with a single market to be achieved by 2008. Whereas the o±cial
adoption of EU-style convergence criteria in 2005 showed some success
for public debt and de¯cit, currency reserves, and interest rates, several
clouds have recently accumulated over the GCC's horizon.
First, in°ation rates have not yet converged among these countries
although in°ation is one of the convergence criteria and is generally
considered as a pre-condition for monetary uni¯cation. Second, and as
a related issue, while all the GCC countries had pegged their national
currency to the U.S. dollar, both Kuwait and the UAE announced that
they would shift to currency baskets, as their international position was
threatened by the depreciation of the U.S. dollar.12 Although the UAE
¯nally reversed its position in favor of a dollar peg, such hesitations can
also be interpreted as an indication that the future common central bank
may have to manage a basket anchor, or even a °oating currency. These
pronouncements came after the announcement by Oman in 2006 that it
is ready to join in 2010 and would let the ¯ve others go ahead with the
integration process. Third, it has to be recognized that a single market
with free circulation of goods, services, labor and capital is still far away.
Fourth, the UAE have decided to withdraw their support for the project,
following the Saudis proclamation that they intended to host the future
common central bank, to be located in Riyadh and now referred to as
the Gulf Central Bank while con¯rmed by the remaining members as
well.
Zaidi (1990) is among the ¯rst to have assessed the GCC monetary
projects. At the time of his writing, while in°ation rates were converging
among the member states, there were worries concerning the divergence
in economic structures, which induces a rather skeptical conclusion that
the whole evidence calls for increased coordination among the member
countries. Other studies have applied the Optimal Currency Areas cri-
teria to the GCC countries. These include Laabas and Limam (2002),
who conclude that, whereas the criteria are not met on an ex-ante basis,
ex-post movements would ensure the viability of the projected monetary
union, Jadresic (2002), who delivers a set of recommendations to ensure
that the bene¯ts of monetary uni¯cation exceed the costs, and Fasano
and Schaechter (2003) and Sturm and Siegfried (2005), who are less crit-
ical although they condition their assessments on improved structural
11See its o±cial website: http://www.gcc-sg.org.
12On the importance of the dollar peg for the region and its relevance to the
monetary union, see Abed et al. (2003) and Rosmy et al. (2010).
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policies.
More recent evaluations based on the OCA criteria include the stud-
ies by Pattanaik (2007), Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008), Buiter (2008a)
and Furceri and Karras (2008).13 While the ¯ndings from the ¯rst two
studies generally indicate that the criteria are not met for the GCC to
form a monetary union, Buiter (2008a) and Furceri and Karras (2008)
are more a±rmative. Buiter (2008) considers a monetary union to be
the only game in town for those countries, stating that \even a subop-
timal monetary union will be better than continued monetary autarky
(Buiter, 2008b, p. 21)." Furceri and Karras (2008) cautiously state that
the estimated costs and bene¯ts of a monetary union strongly vary from
one country to another, but still emphasize the favorable e®ects of strong
convergence in business-cycle synchronization as well as in°ation rates
among most of the GCC members.
On the other hand, Darrat and Al Shamsi (2005) are more optimistic,
as their cointegration test results show that the GCC members' macroe-
conomic variables (namely, GDP, in°ation, exchange rate, money stock
and money base) are linked in the long-run. Hence, they insist that
the uni¯cation process is not impeded by economic divergences, but
by (missing) political willpower. Hebous (2006) is even more upbeat
through looking at the European-style convergence criteria and stress-
ing upon the general similarities among the member states of the GCC.
In the light of our theoretical model above where exposure to rest
of the world shocks is fundamental in assessing the sustainability of the
GCC's prospect as a monetary union, it has to be noted, ¯rst of all, that
the GCC nations do exhibit high degrees of openness. Data from the
Penn World Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009) show that, for two of the
countries, openness ratios are close to 100% (Oman and Qatar), while
that ¯gure is above 100% for three of them (see Table 1, keeping in mind
that Bahrain's ¯gure is probably overestimated, due to its position as a
regional transhipment pole).
Insert Table 1 around here.
However, such an openness does not translate into high trade re-
lations inside the region: exports to the other GCC members from a
member state average merely 5.25% of total exports, a ¯gure that is in
stark contrast with the situation in the European Union, where intra-
EU trade represents between 50 and 80% of the member countries' total
13Furceri and Karras (2008) consider 13 countries from the Middle East, encom-
passing the Gulf Cooperation Council members, and adding Egypt, Iran, Jordan,
Lebanon, Libya, Syria and Yemen to the list of countries.
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trade.14 The prospects look even worse given the recent estimates by
Boughanmi (2008), which show that those already low ¯gures may be
even higher than what one could expect in view of the traditional deter-
minants of a gravity trade equation.
In the light of our model, these two facts combined would form a bad
omen for a successful monetary union.15 If one adds to this picture our
estimates of elasticities of those economies' rates of growth to rest-of-the-
world relations (proxied by their openness ratios), the assessment turns
even more pessimistic (see Table 1). It is apparent from our computa-
tions that most of the GCC countries' growth rates are strongly related
to their openness ratios, the average elasticity being close to 2, with a
standard deviation of 3.75.16 These values are largely superior to the
comparable ones for the Euro area (see Table 1). Hence, any external
shock could have a signi¯cant impact on the prospective members of the
GCC monetary union.
According to the argument by Frankel and Rose (1997, 1998), mone-
tary unions may be more resilient to shocks ex post than ex ante. How-
ever, this argument has been used mostly for internal adjustments needs,
i.e., to explain how the members of a monetary union could cope with
diverging business cycles within their member states while we are con-
cerned here about the in°uence of external shocks.
As far as external shocks are concerned, exchange rate management
could be an important tool to dampen or counter the impacts on the
constituting economies. Such management is all the more signi¯cant as
the GCC countries have clearly expressed the possibility for the future
monetary authority to °oat the currency.17 This consideration directly
suggests the need for the union's central bank to have a su±cient amount
of foreign reserve to be able to cope with external shocks, by adjusting
the value of the common currency's exchange rate as a way to smooth
14This problem has been pinpointed by Dar and Presley (2001) as well. Laabas
and Limam (2002) also regard the limited intra-regional trade as an impediment to
a monetary union in this region.
15Of course, one would prefer to base the diagnosis on the shocks identi¯ed through
a VAR or SVAR model. However, it should be noted that (1) estimating shocks can
be tricky for econometricians in countries whose main export has volatile prices as in
our sample and, (2) these countries mostly have had symmetrical (if not identical)
responses to shocks, given their relation to the U.S. dollar. See Rosmy et al. (2010)
for an evaluation along such lines.
16Abed et al. (2003) compute the elasticity of the region's trade balance to world
GDP variations for the period of 1970-2003. They ¯nd the elasticity to be 9.21.
17See its o±cial statement: http://www.gccsg.org/eng/index.php?action=Sec-
Show&ID=58. Habib and Strasky (2008) show that a dollar peg is not necessarily
optimal for oil exporting countries, and Rosmy et al. (2010) also argue that the
dollar is only relevant to cope with certain types of shocks.
13
the adjustment of the union's economies to external in°uences. Although
many central banks, even among the principal ones, do not have a strong
balance sheet, not to mention external reserves (see Buiter, 2008b), the
GCC countries could probably have a comparative advantage on this
respect. Their external assets are signi¯cantly large. However, they
are mainly located for the moment in the governments' treasuries or
sovereign funds.
Hence, if the GCC countries are to proceed towards a full-°edged
monetary union, one of the most important step they may have to take
is to agree on the size and composition of their common central bank's
balance sheet. Although this issue might appear technical, such a move
would show a strong political commitment and may prove to be the key
to the sustainability of their monetary union.
4.2 Insights from Europe
For the sake of comparison, the European Monetary Union (EMU) is a
nice benchmark. Let us ¯rst recall that, since the implementation of the
monetary union in Europe, several countries of the union, and occasion-
ally the union itself, have been hit by shocks originating either from the
United States, or from some commodity or ¯nancial markets. The im-
pacts of these external shocks sometimes became so signi¯cant upon the
Euro area members' economies that they created some tensions inside
the monetary union, to the extent that certain Italian politicians even
reconsidered the bene¯ts of remaining inside the union and threatened to
exit unilaterally, for instance.18 Although such a political remark could
have been directed towards the Italian electorate without substantial im-
plications, the scenario has also been explored by Tilford (2006), under
a 40 % probability of occurrence. Moreover, Nitsch (2005), Rose (2007)
and Bordo and James (2008) o®er the historical relevance of splitting
scenarios.
Notwithstanding, Favero and Giavazzi (2008) concretely show that
the levels of long-term rates in Europe are almost entirely explained by
shocks originating from the U.S. Their results notably suggest that U.S.
variables are more important than local variables in the policy rules
followed by the European monetary authorities. In other words, the
European monetary union would be no exception in that external shocks
18Although the exit possibility was ruled out by the Maastricht Treaty, it had
been introduced in the draft Treaty for the European Constitution. The draft has
been rejected on many grounds other than this one and it has been reformulated as
the Lisbon Treaty, which still maintains a unilateral withdrawal possibility under its
article 49A. This issue resurfaced during the Greek crisis of 2010, but it occurred the
other way round in this particular case, as some politicians in \virtuous" countries
questioned the presence of Greece in the union.
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may put its members' economies under considerable stress.
It should be noted that we are not considering the asymmetric char-
acters of internal shocks a®ecting the members of the union. What
we consider here are the di®erences in their reactions when external
shocks hit the whole union, and when they do so with di®ering intensi-
ties. The sources of such di®ering intensities can be numerous and have
been listed, e.g. by Dornbusch et al. (1998). A prominent source in
our context is the pass-through of an exchange rate variation of a com-
mon currency compared to currencies of the rest of the world. And, if
the member countries are a®ected di®erently in this regard, prices can
evolve di®erently inside the union, calling into question the e±ciency of
its single monetary policy, and the viability of the union. Di®erent price-
setting behaviors can be traced back to the specializations of its member
countries, with countries which produce more \up-market" goods being
more capable of leaving their export prices una®ected and, accordingly,
of smoothing external shocks. Based on this argument, Drissi (2008)
obtains estimates that show a one-to-four di®erence between Germany
and the Netherlands in the respective reactions of their price levels to
real exchange rates variations.
Thus, strong disparities in the exposures to external shocks cannot
be easily dismissed even inside the European monetary union, which
has underwent the integration process of sixty years. Therefore, the
in°uences of such disparities upon the viability of a multinational mon-
etary union need to be accounted for. From a normative point of view,
Arnold (2006) shows that, under such circumstances, the European Cen-
tral Bank should be concerned more about the evolutions of countries
that do not have strong trading ties with non-eurozone countries, and
also more about the bigger countries (as small countries are relatively
more open and trade more outside the euro area, thus bene¯ting from an
automatic stabilizing instrument in the form of real exchange rate ad-
justment). The empirical evidence by Sturm and WollmershÄauser (2008)
suggests that this has not been the case so far, as developments in the
smaller countries seem to have received more than proportional weights
in the ECB's decision-making. Such a disproportional attention would
be worrying if it is sustained for a prolonged period.19
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we show that the sustainability of a monetary union not
only depends on the reorganization and rationalization of production
19Indeed, this discrepancy could be expected from a theoretical point of view since
smaller countries accept to enter a monetary union only if their weight is larger than
their size (Casella 1992a and Casella 1992b).
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activities inside the union (i.e., internal shocks), but also on the impact
of external shocks. Unfortunately, the literature has mostly disregarded
this rest-of-the-world feature. We have given a theoretical foundation to
Bordo and James's (2008) historical argument that external shocks can
impair a union's viability.
As one of the most striking real-world examples of a monetary union
project that could be threatened by external shocks, we deliver a rel-
atively pessimistic assessment of the sustainability of the prospective
monetary union project conceived among the Gulf Cooperation Coun-
cil nations. However, if the members countries' political commitments
are su±ciently ¯rm, and if they transfer large amounts of their o±cial
reserves to their future common central bank, the project might be re-
garded as more favorable.
The problem we highlight here may also concern other potential com-
mon currency projects. In the Asian region, for example, the prospect
of a monetary union among the ASEAN members also seems plagued
by the in°uence of shocks from the rest of the world. Among others,
the recent estimates by Qin and Tan (2008) show that a large part of
the variance in economic conditions within the region come from what
they call \world factors." This illustrates the need to pay attention not
just to internal aspects but also external conditions in considering future
monetary union projects.
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Table 1. 
 
Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
Compared with the European Monetary Union 
 
 
Openness 
ratio (%) 
GDP 
elasticity 
w.r.t. 
openness 
Gulf Cooperation 
Council 
  
Bahrain 158.89 0.32 
Kuwait 101.55 9.49 
Oman 89.23 0.08 
Qatar 90.75 0.43 
Saudi Arabia 71.38 0.55 
United Arab 
Emirates 
140.23 0.15 
Average 108.67 1.84 
Standard dev. 33.64 3.75 
European 
Monetary Union 
  
Average 80.91 0.19 
Standard dev. 39.11 0.34 
Source: authors' computations, 1990-2007 averages. 
For consistency, EMU excludes Cyprus, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia. Data from Penn World 
Tables 6.3 (Heston et al., 2009). 
 
